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IN THE SUPRSME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF SALT LAKE CITY, a
municipal corporation;
EMIGRATION PROPEP.TIES
PARTNERSHIP' a Utah limi tea
partnership; BOWERSSORENSON COPSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a TJtah corooration,
and FRED A. SMOLKA,

BRIEF OF
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Case No. 16649

Defendants-Appellants,
vs.
PETER DOENGSS, MILES
CROCKARD, WILLIAM BOWEN,
RICHARD H. WATSON, CARL
PETERSON, and EMIGRATION
IMPROVEMF.NT DISTRICT,
Plaintiffs-Respondents.
STATEMENT OF THE NATUPE OF THE CASE
Respondents brought an qction in the District Court
seeking to have the Utah statute authorizing annexation
declared unconstitutional.
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT
The lower court qranted respondents' motion for summary
judqment and held that Section 10-2-401 Utah Code Annotated
1953, as enacted by the Laws of Utah 1977, is
unconstitutional.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's order
and a determination by this Court that the statute
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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authorizinq annexation of certain property located within
Emigration Canyon, to Salt LakP City, is constitutional.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Between September 1977 and August 1978, three
annexation petitions, subject of this appeal, were filed
with the Board of Salt Lake City Commissioners.

These

petitions, when consolidated for consideration by the

Ci~

Commission, described a contiquous parcel of unincorporatej
territory abutting the eastern boundary of Salt Lake City ir
an area known as Emigration Canyon.

The purpose of the

petitions appeared to be to uparade current service

le~ls

in the canyon and to expand petential for resinential
(Mayor's Deposition, p. 23-

development within the area.
24).

Each annexation petition was, upon receipt, referrea t'
the Salt Lake City Plannina and Zoninq Commission for
investigation and recommendation.

Final recommendation was

made by the Planning Commission on Auqust 10, 1978,
following approximately 8 months of study, including public
hearings, on the proposal.
that:

'!'he Planninq Commission found

(a) the prooosed annexation met necessary petition

requirements: (b) the only way the area could receive
adequate services was frol'l Salt r,ake Citv: ann (c) the bas;
purpose of a city is to provide "proper services to
developina areas."

11.ccorc'l ing ly, the Plannina Commission
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recommended in favor of annexation ann oroposed that a
public hearinq he held by the City Com~ission to consider
the matter.

(Jorqensen Deposition, Exhibit "l").

The City Commission in turn conducted its own
investiqation of the annexation oroposal and held numerous
public hearings thereon.

During deliberations, it

considered reports and documents from City departments,
public aqencies and private individuals on zonina, sewer,
water, flood control, health, traffic and terrain conditions
and the City's ability to service the area in these
respects.

It also e\raluated police, fire, refuse coll<=!ction

and other such services.

In addition, all residents,

property owners and interested citizens wishinq to be heard
were qiven an opportunity to express their opinions and
present facts, which were fully considered by the
Commission.

(Mayor's Deposition, p. 26-33).

On April 10, 1979, followinq consideration of the
foregoing factors, the City Commission voted unanimously, in
public hearing, to approve the petitions for annexation.
(Mayor's Deposition, Exhibit "l").

The following day,

respondents obtained a preliminary iniunction from the
District Court restraining the City from approving by
ordinance the annexation.

That injunction remains in

current effect.
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,\RGUMICNT
SECTION 10-2-401, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953, AS El'lACTED BY THE LAWS OF UTAH
1977, DOES NOT VIOLATE T8E EOUAL
PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES OR UTAH CONSTITUTIONS.
A.

THE COURT SHOULD GIVE THE LEGISLATIVE ACT
THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY ABSENT A
SHOWING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE DEPRIVED OF
A "VOTING RIGHT" UNDER THE UTA!-!
ANNEXATION STATUTP..

Four distinct types of annexation procedures are
utilized in this country, namely:

( 1) special act of the

state legislature; (2) <'leleqation of annexino power direct!
to cities;

(3) acts of appointe<'I commissions; and (4)

popular determination.

The selection of which method to be

used for the extension of municipal boundaries within a
state is "purely a political matter, entirely within the
power of the state leqislature to requlate.
words, a legislative function."
Corporations,

(Vol. 2)

~7.10,

It is, in othe:

McOuillin, Municipal

p. 297.

The annexaton method selected by the Utah leqislatITTe
is the delegation of the annexinq power directly to
municipal governing bodies; however, in Utah, annexation G
initiatea by petition of a majority of the oropertv owners,
within the area proposed to be annexe<'I.

At all times

relevant herein, Section 10-7-401, Utah Code Annotated,

1953, provided in this reqard as follows:
"Whenever a maioritv of the owners of real
property and the owners of at least one third
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in value of the real nropertv, as shown bv
the ~ast assessment rolls, in territory lving
contiguous to the corporate boundaries of anv
municipalitv, shall desire to annex such
territory to such municipality, they shall
cause an accurate plat or map of such
territory to be made under the supervision of
the municipal enqineer or a competent
surveyor, and a copy of such plat or man,
certified by the enaineer or surveyor as the
case may be, shall be filed in the office of
the recorder of the municipality, tooether
with a written petition signed by a majority
of the real property owners and hy the owners
of not less than one third in value of the
real property, as shown by the last
assessment rolls, of the territory described
in the plat or map; • • • "
(Emohasis added).
Upon receipt of such a petition the municipality is
empowered to review such annexation in light of its
resources and the equities of the matter and determine the
advisability of the boundary proposal.

Section 10-2-401,

described this process as follows:
"
• the governing body of the
municipality, at a reqular meetino shall vote
on the question of such annexation. The
members of the qoverning body m~y by
resolution passed by a two-thirds vote,
accept the petitio~ for annexation, subject
to the terms and conditions as they deem
reasonable, and the territory shall then and
there be annexed and within the boundaries of
the municipality . • • • "
This particular orovision was amenr.ed by the 197!?
Legislature to make minor chanqes not pertinent here.

With

the exception of the inclusion of the requirement pertaininq
to one-third of the value of the real prooertv in 1957, the
foreqoinq statute has provided for the initiation of

_c:;_
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annexation Proceedings, hy a written petition of a

na~oritv

of the real propertv owners, since 189R.
In adopting a statutory procedure, the state
leoislature is presumed to have acted within its
constitutional powers.
this issue as

The Utah Supreme Court has aridress~1

follo~s:

"It is well settled in this state, as
elsewhere, that the courts will not declare a
statute unconstitutional unless it clearly
and manifestly violates some provision of the
constitution of the United States.
F.verv
presumption must be indulged in favor of the
constitutionality of an act, and every
reasonable doubt resolved in favor of its
validity.
(citations omitted) The whole
burden lies on hi~ who denies the
constitutionality of a leqislative
enactment. State v. Packer, 297 ~- 1013,
1016 (Utah, 1911). See also State v.
Packard, 250 P.2d 561 (Utah, 1952) (Emohasis
added).
In the recent case of Freeman v. Centerville City,
(filed September 21, .1979), this Court upheld the
constitutionality of the verv annexation statute here in
question~

in doing so, the Court expressed its extreme

reluctance to interfere with the legislative prerogatives
contained in our statutory annexation process.

The Court,

citing numerous supporting cases, summarized as follows:
"The power to change or modify municipal
boundaries is a legislative f1Jnction, and as
long as the statutory process is complied
with, the courts will not aenerally interfere
with the legislative prernqative, even thouqh
a person's property by becoming subiect to
different ;urisniction mav be suhiect to
different rules, obliqations, or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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assessments."
This willingness of the Utah Suoreme Court to extend
broan discretion to legislative hodies in establishinq
municipal boundaries is fully consistent with lonqstanoing
precedent recognized nationally as early as 1907 in the
leading case of Hunter v. Pittsburq, 207 U.S. 161, 52 L.Ed.
151, 28 s.ct. 40.

That policy was reaffirmed in the

recently reported case of Holt Civil Cluh v. Tuscalousa, U.S. -, - S.Ct. -, 58 L.Ed.2d 292 (1978) wherein the Supreme
Court stated:
"Government, observed Mr. Justice Johnson,
'is the science of experiment [citation
omitted) and a state is afforded wide leeway
when experimenting with the appropriate
allocation of state leaislative pawer. This
Court has often recognized that Political
subdivisions such as cities and counties are
created by the State 'as convenient aqencies
for exercisinq such of the governmental
powers of the State as may he intrusted to
them.'
[citations omitted)
In Hunter v.
City of Pittsburg, supra, the court discusse~
at lenqth the relationship between a State
ann its political subdivisions, renarkina:
'The number, nature and duration of the
powers conferred upon [municipal]
corporations and the territory over which
they shall be exercised rests in the absolute
discretion of the state.'
Ibid. While the
broad statements as to state control over
municipal corporations contained in Hunter v.
City of Pittsburg, supra, have undoubtedly
been aualified by the holdings of later cases
such as Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.,
supra, we think that the case continues to
have substantial constitutional significance
in emphasizing the extraordinarily.wide
.
latitude that states have in creating various
types of political subdivisions and
conferring authoritv upon them."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

The case of I~ramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.s,
621, 23 L.Ed.2d 583, 89

s.ct.

1886 (1969) cited by the Coun

above, is one of several cases which have carved a narrow
exception to the "extraordinarily wide latitude" th e

s upre~,,

Court has granted state leqislaLures in equal protection
matters.

It is precisely upon this case which the Third

District Court placed heavy ieliance in its invalidation~
the Utah annexation statute.
At issue in Kramer was a New York voter qualification
statute that limited the vote in school district elections
largely to property owners within the district.

Without

deciding whether or not a State may in some circumstances
limit the franchise to residents primarily affected by the
activities of a given aovernmental unit, the court held that
the statute was not sufficiently tailored to meet that state
interest since its classifications excluded some residents
of the district who had direct interests in school boarn
decisions and included many others whose interests were
remote.
The upshot of Kramer and related cases, is that the
traditional presumption of constitutional vali~ity of a
statute remains and if the court can

conceiv~

of anv

rational connecton between the classification and a pro~r
state objective, the act will bE> held valid.

However, if

the law creates a "suspect classification," such as ra~. M
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affects a "fundamental right" such as the riqht to vote, and
the state action affects plaintiffs differently erom other
people who are similarly situated, the burden will fall on
the state to prove that the classification is necessary to
promote a "compelling interest."

See Holt, ~· p. 299;

Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, at 562, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12
L.Ed.2d 506 (1964).
A "fundamental riqht" is alleged to have been violated
in this action, namely, the riqht to vote.

As will be shown

in Section B hereof, participation in Utah's annexation
petition process is not a fundamental, voting riqht.
Berrv v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir., 1978).

Ree

Therefore,·

the Utah annexation statute is presumed constitutional and
the Court should reverse the decision of the lower court and
rule, as a matter of law, that the statute is valid.
B.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED
THAT TO PETITION FOR ANNEXATION UNDER
UTAH STATUTES CONSTIT[JTES A VOTING
RIGHT.
FURTHER, NO BASIS FOR AN EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAIM EXISTS IN THE ABSENCE OF
SUCH A RIGHT.

The Third District Court in the instant action did not
rule as to whether the statutory annexation process had been
complied with.

Instead, it concluded that Section 10-2-401,

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is void on its face in that it
contravenes the equal protection provisions of both state
and federal constitutions by denyinq the right of "persons
other than taxpayers" a voice in the annexation process.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The lower court based its decision on the Kramer case,
supra, ann upon several other cases construinq equal
protection provisions as they aoplv to the exercise of
elective franchise.

Also

cit~d

was a student authored

t~
l~

review article proposing that the principles aoplied in
these voter franchise cases should be extended to

precl~e

the annexation oetition process e1T1oloyed within our state.
Conspicuously absent was any case ruling on the point at
issue - the constitutionality of a non-elective petition
process leadinq to a legislative determination.
Interestingly, in its necision voiainq the statute
which establishes the sole mechanism for annexation within
our state, the district court acknowledqed the

existance~

the very recent case of 'l'orres v. Villaqe of Capitan, 582
P.2d 1277 (New Mexico, 1978).

However, the Court failed t0

follow that decision and it is the only case noted by the
lower court which was in point.

In fact, the holdinq of

that case is on all fours with the issues in the instant
action.
In the Torres case, the Supreme Court of New Mexico
upheld ons annexation statute similar to the TJtah statute.
This law permitted cities to approve annexation of
contiquous territory upon receipt of petitions signed by
"owners of a majority of the number of acres in the
contiguous territory."

Like the case before the Bar, the
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parties in that case sought to void the New Mexico
annexation statute by attemptinq to equate the siqninq of an
annexation petition with the "riqht to vot-.•
~ "

In rloina so,

they attempted to avail themselves of the sane case law
regardinq elective processes now reliea upon by plaintiffs
in the instant action.
The New Mexico Court, however, rejected that
equation.

It correctly held:

"that petitioning for annexation of lana in
this case is not a fundamental voting right
an<l that §14-7-17, [the annexation statute in
question) supra, is constitutional." Id. at
p. 1283
-Plaintiffs' argument before the District Court in the
case at hand parrots precisely the reasoning heard and
rejected by the New Mexico high court.

(See Exhibit "A,•

Brief of Salt Lake County as amicus curiae, corrected Auqust
14, 1979).

Not one single case has been presented by

plaintiff-respondents which holds for the position they urqe
this court to novelly adopt; namely, that petition process
leading to

?.

leqislative determination on annexation is

unconstitutional.
Rather, each case relied upon dealt with either an
election or a petition process which lead to an election.
As such, the cases presented by plaintiffs and relied upon
by the District Court are clearly not in ooint.

Numerous additional attempts have recently been made to
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strike down, on equal protection grounds, oetition process'
leading to review of annexation proposals by municipal
bodies.

As in Torres, each such challenqe has faileC!,

n,,

most recent case, in which such an attack h2s been
considerea is Berry v. Bourne, 588 P. /.n 422 ( 1978).

In th!

case, the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled valid the statutP., which authorized municipal
annexaton within the State of South Carolina under a sirnil'
petitioning process as employed in the Utah statute.
The South Carolina statute authorizP.d the qoverninq
body of a city, upon filing of a petition siqned by seventv
five percent or more of the freeholders in any area
contiguous to the city requesting annexation, to annex surl
area by the adoption of an appropriate resolution.

The

plaintiff in that action, one of thirteen registerec'I voter'
living in an area oroposed to be annexed, sought an
injunction against the City of North Charleston.

He

asserted that the statute, by denying to the reqistered
voters the right to vote on the annexation, violated ~e
rights of such voters under the equal protection clause.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's denia
of the injunction and upheld the South Carolina annexation
statute.

In doinq so, that Court relien upon the broad

lanquaqe of the Suorerne Court in Hunter, suora, and upootl
cases which followed it.

These cases unequivicallv declar'
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that annexation by a city is purely a state political or
legislative matter, entirely within the power of the state
legislature to regulate.
It was urged, however, by plaintiffs attackina the
statute, that Hunter, supra, and the many cases decided
unaer it, must be considered to have been overruled by the
later decisions in Cipriano v. City of Houma, (1969) 395
U.S. 701, 89 s.ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 and

~ramer,

supra.

However, such an assertion was without merit because, these
cases merely established the princiole that otherwise
qualified electors may not be excluded from voting in an
election on the basis that they did not own uroperty within
the area.

They do not consider and do not relate to the

process of by which a legislative body considers exercisinq
its legislative function of approving an annexation.
Therefore, they have no precidential value in the matter at
issue.
The Fourth Circuit Court correctly analysed these
authorities and noted that there is no basis for an equal
protection claim where no one is qiven the riqht to vote on
the matter of annexation.

'J'he court emphasized that under

the petition process before it, no such votinq riaht existed
because final determination of the matter was reserved to
the municipal authority.

The Court surnrnarized this point as

follows:
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"We emphasize aqain that neither freeholders
nor electors as such are aiven the riqht to
vote on annE>xation unrler the statntE> jn
question; that riaht is qiven exclusively to
the aoverninq boara of the annexinq city.
It
is true that three-fourths of the freeholders
in the area to be annexed must request
annexation before the qoverning body of the
annexing city may consider annexation. ~his
is a common preliminary Prerequisite for
authorization of an annexatio~, whether by
election or by action of the annexing city's
governing board. But the important fact is
that the action of the freeholders in siqning
the request for annexation does not authorize
annexation. Annexation depends wholly upon
the favorable vote of the governing hody of
the annexing city. This is the crucial
action and on that neither freeholders nor
electors as such have a vote. Since the
electors of the municipalitv of the area to
be annexed are not given the riaht to vote
under the challenaed statute, the aoplication
of the statute ooses no eaual protection
issue.
(Emphasis adned).
The court further aistinauished each of the cases cit'
by plaintiffs as dealing solelv with the elective
and inapplicable to a petition process

lea~ing

to a

legislative consideration:
"We find nothing in the several decisions
dealing with restrictions on the riaht to
vote (~haracterized by the plaintiff as cases
touching on the burden of the right to vote)
applicable in the context of the issue before
us.
In all those cases cited by the
plaintiff, there was to be an election ana
the constitutional attack was directed by
restraints upon the riaht to vote in that
election. The proceaure challenged by the
plaintiff in this case, however, involv~s no
election; in fact, it is a procedure which
does not contemplate an election.
Consequently, we are not cnncerned with anv
unconstitutional limitation upon the r1aht to
vote in an election." At p. 425.
(Emphasis
-1'1-
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added).
The New Mexico Suoreme Court and Fourth Circuit Court
of Apneals were clear in their re:iection of arquments which
would invalidate annexation on equal protection grounds,
when such procedures involve leqislative rather than
election processes.

Further, there does not appear to be a

"voting right" present where the annexation decision is
judicially, rather than legislatively determined.

See

Citizens Committee to Oppose Annexation v. City of
Lynchburq, Virginia, 400 F.Supp. 68 (1976) affirmed in
relevant respects 528 F.2o 816 (1976) application for
injunction denied 96 S.Ct. 766, 423 U.S. 1043, 46 L.Ed.2d
632 (1976).

Plaintiffs contend, without authority of law,

that there is no constitutional difference between voting
ann petitioning.

It seems obvious, however, to this writer

and to apparently all courts which have ruled upon this
particular annexation question, that althouah the elective
process is "popular" the annexation process here under
consideration is "legislative" in nature.

That is, the

decision as to whether to annex does not lie with the public
at the ballot box, but with the elected representatives on
the City Commission.
The Utah annexation process does not in any respect
constitute an "election" has been made conclusively clear in
Utah.

Less than t~o months ago, in the Freeman case, supra,
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held aqainst a constitutional attack on our annexation
statute focused on due process orounds.

It was contend~

the plain ti ff in that action that the annexaton statute h
constitutionally defective because it failed to provide~
those in the area to be annexed must receive notice of the
annexation proceedings ann the riqht to elect whether or n·
to have their property anneied.

It was arqued by the

plaintiff that (hecause his property would be subiect ~l
assessments, liens, and encumbrances imposed by the city
through annexation), he was deprived of property without d!
process of law by the annexation.
In that action, this Court reaffirmed its

reluctan~t

interfere in a fundamentally legislative process and statei
as follows concerning the assertion that the petition
process constituted an election:
"In enacting §10-2-401 the Legislature
established a means for annexation which
calls for the consent of both the annexing
municipality and a maiority of the prooerty
owners in the area seekina annexaton.
The
initiation of the annexation process bv~
petition is not the equivalent of an
election, nor need it be.
It is onlv the
triqaerinq process for the concerned
municioalitv to consummate the annexation
procedure b~ exercising its legislative oower
if it deems it appropriate to do so.
(Emphasis added).
Freeman v. Centerville
City,
In holding that a petition process leadina to a
leqislative determination does not constitute an election,
this Court reaffirmed its longstandinq holdinq
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.

Pat teric!

in~

v. Carbon Water Conservancv Dist., 145 P.2a 503 (Utah,
1944).

In that case, this Court ruled aqainst an equal

protection challenge to a statutory procedure, which
precluded owners of property whose assessed valuation was
less than $300 from petitionino for creation of a proposed
conservancy district.

The Court summarized its decision

upholding the statute as follows:
"The legislature had the oower to create a
water conserva.ncv district bv its own fiat.
It need not have given anv individual or
qroup the riqht to petition for the creation
of a district.
It was within its discretion
to determine what qualification, if anv, a
petitioner for the creation of a district
must have, since the petition for the
forMation or the formation of the district
itself do not affect any property riohts.
Had the legislature created the district it
could have provided for a tax on all property
within the district to pay for the costs and
maintenance of the project.
See In re
Proposed Middle Rio Grande Co~servancy
District, 31 N.M. 188, 242 P. 683, at Paqe
689, in which the court in determining that a
provision in its water conservancy act that
only resident freeholders could sign the
petition for the formation of the district
was not unconstitutional quotes with approval
the followinq statement of the Californa
Supreme Court deciding a similar question in
the case of In re Bonds of the Madera
Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 296, 7.8 P. 272,
675, 14 L.R.A. 755, 27 Arn. St.Rep. 106: 'It
is objected to this, that it is placing in
the hands of those not interested the pawer
of imposing a burden upon t~e owners of the
land, who may be a small minority of the
electors within that district, or who may
even be nonresidents of the rlistrict. This,
however, is a matter which was addressed
purelv to the discretion of the
Leq i slature. Whether such a petition sh<?uld
he ma~e bv the owners oF a fixed proportion
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of the land, as was required in thP
reclamation l~w, or whether there shoul~ he
any qualification to the petitioners, or
whether there shoula he anv limit to the
expenses which they were authorized to incur
for the purposes of the improvement, are
questions which were solely for the
consideration of the Leqislature. * * * It
must be observed, however, that this petition
has no bindinq operation, but is merely the
initiatory step which qives to the board of
supervisors a iurisdiction to act uoon the
expediency or oolicy of authorizinq. the
creation of the district.'"
(Emphasis added)
ra. at p. 512.
It is clear from the above that, under an electi"e
process, the eligible citizenry is aiven authority to mab
final determination on a political issue.

Bxclusion frm

the process excludes a party from meaningful participatioo
altogether.

However, as stated by this Court, our

annexation process differs fundamentally from an elective
process.

This is true because citizens do not effectuate

the annexation; rather,

they merely, by petition, permit

the matter to be considered by the elected officials ~a~~
with responsibility for delivery of the municipal
services.
In other words, annexation decisions in Utah are made
by elected representatives of the ~ublic, they are not Jllarle
directly by the public itself.

This representative

principle and process is fully comoatible with fundamental
constitutional principles.
Under Utah and most other state annexation procenurP,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

anv interested person may appear personally or by petition
before the elected officials of the city and have their
views heard and considerea.

In fact, the voluminous record

before the Court in this appeal demonstrates the areat
extent to which the views and expressions of all interested
persons were solicited and consiaered by the City and its
elected officials.

In the words of Mayor Wilson:

"I took pride in the fact I read almost every
document word by wora.
I don't say I read
everythinq, but I made an attempt to and took
all of that into account when I made my own
decision."
(Mayor Wilson Deoosition at 33).
Thus, the petition by a majority of oroperty owners in
the area proposed for annexation was not the means by which
the decision to annex was made.

~he

petition did Provide

the statutory means by which the City Commission assured
itself that a need and desire for municipal services existed
in the subiect area prior to aporovina annexation.
The United State Supreme Court has recently ioinea
other courts (cited herein) in haltinq attempts to unduly
extend this "one man, one vote" doctrine articulated in
Kramer beyond its intended scope.

In Holt, supra, the

Supreme Court considered the equal protection claim of
certain residents of a small unincorporated community near
the corporate limits of Tuscalousa, Alabama.

The issues of

th0t case focused on a statute which aave extraterritorial
cff~ct to municioal police and sanitary ordinances.

It was
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contended that the statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by extending such ~

1

over persons residing outsiae municipal boundaries, wit~
permitting such residents to vote in rnnnicipal elections.

-

The Court therein rejected the contention that under ~~
and cases wich followed in its wake, the state's denial~
the franchise to police iurisdiction residents could star·
only if justified bv "a compellina state interest."
contrary, the court concluded:

~~

"some rational relations'.

to a legitimate state purpose" is all that is required. :
at p. 29q and p.

302.

The Court further s11mmarized its twlainas in all of.
voter-qualification cases, includinq Kramer.

It articula:

the common ct:aracteristic existant in all such cases anc
stated:
"From these and our other votina
qualifications cases a com~on characteristic
emerqes:
the challenqed statute in each case
denied the franchise to individuals who were
physically resident within the aeoaraphic
boundaries of the governmental entity
concernea.

* * *
"No necision of this Court has extenaen the
•one nan, one vote' nrinciole to individuals
residinq bevond the qeoaraohic confines of
the qovern~ental entitv concerned, be it the
state or its political subdivision.
On the
contrarv, our cases have unifor~ly recoanized
that a qovernrnental unit may leaitimately
restrict the riaht to participate in its
political processes to those vh0 reside
within its horders.
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* * *
"The line heretofore markea by this Court's
votinq qualifications decisions coincides
with the geographical boundary of the
governmental unit at issue, and we hold that
appellant's case, like their homes, falls on
the farther side."
Id. at op. 300-302.
(Emphasis added).
Thus,

in the case at hand, respondents' efforts to

extend "voting riahts" beyond the territorial limits of the
municipality are without authoritv of law.

Purther, the

case law is uniform in holdina that a petition process,
leading to leaislative consideration of an annexation
proposal is not in any resoect an election: thus, such a
petitionina process is in everv sense constitutional.

C.

SECTION 10-2-401, WHICH PF.RMITS THB
INITIATION OF ANNEXJ\_TION PROCEEDINGS BY
PETITION OF PROPERTY OWNERS, BEARS A
RATIONAL RRLATIONSHIP "'0 A LEGITIMN'.'E
STATE PURPOSE AND NO BASIS OF AN EQUAL
PROTECTION CL.II.Ir-'! EXISTS IN T<-tE FAC.F OF
SUCH A PELATIONSHIP.

Stripped of its votina rights attire, the equal
protection issue oresented by respondents be~omes whether
the ntah annexation statute bears so!'le rational relationship
to a legitimate state purpose.

Ahsent a showing of a voting

riaht, the Supreme Court in Holt, supra, reasoned that the
"Equal Protection Clause is offended only if the statute's
classification rests upon qrounds whollv irrelevant to the
achi<>vernent of the state's obiective."

At oaae 302.

r11rther, a court's inauirv is limiteo to the question of
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whether "any state of facts reasonahlv mav
. he cone" i verJ t
iustify" the challenqed statute.
In the case of .l\da:ns v. City of Colorado Sor inos, l~f
F.Supp. 1397 (D. Colo.,

1970) the court denied an equal

protection challenge to a Colorado annexation statute, th,
statute required an election for annexation where the
perimeter of the territory was less than two-thirds
contiguous with the municipality, and permitted a

petit~

but no election, in areas of more than two-thirds
contiguity.

The plaintiffs in that action conceded that•

legislature was emoowerea to create annexation Jllachinerv,
without aranting the riqht to vote; however, they maintair.
that if the legislature extenne<'l the Franchise to one qro1
it must exten<'l the same right to another arouP absent a
"compelling puhlic reason."

In re1ectino Plaintiffs'

constitutional claim and the strict stannard of review~
propose<'l, the Court reasoned in part as follows:
"We are unable to hold that the distinction
recognized by the Assembly as to when the
franchise may be exercised is unreasonahle in
light of the manifest purposes for the
differentiation.
Thus, where the area to be
annexed has less than two-thirds contiauity
with the annexing city, the interrelationship
between the annexed areas and the city mav
not be great enouqh to warrant a oolitically
undesirable unilateral Jllerger. Where,
however, the territory to be annexed has over
two-thir<'ls contiauitv with the annexina city,
the interrelationshi~ between the two areas
is or can be so close that the city should be
allowed to annex despite the unwillinoness of
the residents of the annexed territory.
The
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law thus recoqnizes ~hat a municipality such
as Color~~o Sprinas is severelv handic~noed
by an anneyation law which rPquires the
approval of the prooerty owners an~ aualifie~
electors of an annexea area.
It is unable to
deal with qroups of citizens who form small
tax colonies on the bor0er of the core city
which is the economic base of the urban area
and to which the colonies owe their verv
existence and yet pay nothinq for the
advantaqe which the city orovides. These
people would seldom consent to the annexation
and their non-consent would threaten the very
existencR of the core city."
(Emohasis
added).
The New Mexico Supreme Court in

~orres,

supra, likewise

applied only "minimum scrutiny" in upholdinq the
constitutionality of that state's annexation petition
statute.

In that case the court, on its own, found rational

basis for the initiation of annexation bv propertv owners:
"There being no provision in our law for an
election on this issue, we have even less
need to apply strict scrutiny reaardina the
issue bearing on violation of the equal
protection clause than was true in Adams,
supra. Only minimum scrutinv need be aoolied
to uphold the constitutionality of our
statutes since they do not involve elections
and therefore do not infrinae upon the
fundamental riaht to vote • . Under this level
of scrutinv a statutorv discrimination of
i~eaualitv.will not be. set aside if any state
of facts reasonably mav be conceived to
iustify it. [Citation omitted) The record
need not show what the reasonable basis is
since the appellate court mav on its own find
a reasonable basis.
[Citation omitted] One
obvious and rational basis for the initiation
of the annexation by owners of a majority of
the acreaqe is that taxes to support the
Villaqe will be partiallv apportioned in
·accordance with the amount of land owned by
t~~ new residents or landowners brouaht into
thP Villae. Our statutes meet the test of
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minimum scrutiny."

(Emphasis anded).

In determininq whether a rational basis exists furt
initiation of annexaton hy property owners in our starQ
-.,
sbould be borne in mino that municipalities 'ffe suhdivisr
of the state ann their purooses are statutory in nat.ure.
namely to deliver municioal services.

The lq79 statp

leq islature specifically stated such in Sect ion 10-2-401
the newly adopted annexation law as follows:

"10-2-401. The legislature hereby declares
that it is leaislative policy that:
"(l) Sound urban development is essential to
the continued economic development of this
state;
"(2) Municipalities are created to provide
urban aovernmental services essential ~or
sound urban development and for the
protection or public health, safety and
welfare in residential, commercial and
industrial areas, and in ~reas underaoina
r1evelopment;"
The leqislature further,

in Suhsect-.ion (3) of that

section, delineated the oolicv uoon which municipal
annexations should be qoverned.
"(3)
Municipal boundaries should be
extended, in accordance with specific
standards, to include areas where a hiah
quality of urban qovernmental services is .
needed and can be provided for the orotect1on
of public health, safety and welfare and to
avoid the inequities of double taxation and
the proliferation of snecial service
districts;"
It is apparent from the foreaoina that where ur~n
services are needPn, cities not only mav, b~1t shoulr1, ,,
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their boundaries in accordance with leqislative standard.
Such is the purpose for which they were created and such is
the purpose for which the Emiaration Canyon Annexation was
petitioned for and approved.
It must be borne in mind that annexation is lara.ely the
means by which development occurs ~ithin our state.

Thus,

where annexation is contemplated, the health of state
citizens and the economic welfare of the state rest in the
balance.

To the extent that annexation machinery is

complicated annexation is discouraged.

When annexation is

discouraaed, either (1) develooment is retarned;

(?.)

limited

function entities proliferate; or (3) double taxation
inequities are generated.

Accordinclv, a streamlined

annexation mechanism is an essential element of state and
municipal welfare.
It must also be considered, as the court in Adams,
supra, was auick to point out, that an annexaton law which
requires the approval of propertv owners and qualified
electors of an annexed area, severely handicaps annexation
efforts.

Residents of "tax colonies" on the fringes of the

core city pay nothina for the advantaaes the city provides
and accordingly seldom consent to annexation.

Further, the

mohile nat11re of our modern urhan communities make
ascertainment of residencv an often burdensome Procedure.
l\ccornincilv, the Utah leaislature has estal:>lishe<i a
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st~tD_

trioqerinq mechanism for annexation within our

"

Which

does not attempt to determine actual ownership or
residency.

It has deferred,

instead, to the Countv tax

rolls for an ascertainment of persons gualifyin<: to be
tallied on an annexation petition count.

The purpose of

that count is not to allow croperty owners to "vote" or
otherwise make a decision on the annexation.

The petition

merely provides the statutory means hy which the City
Co~mission

assures itself that some need and desire for

annexation exists "lithin the sub"iect area prior to apnrovir
annexation.
Tax rolls were likely selected as the reference source
because qualifications of petition sionatories could be
easilv and finally determined therefrom.

The lono history

of this process in Utah and its retention in the 1979
leqislative revision are testimonv of the leoislatures
acceptance of the mechanism as an effective means to acinreE
its policy

oh~ectives.

It is possible to speculate on the existence of ~u~I
inexpensive and simple mechanisms for approxirnatino local
support for annexation; however, the oolitical science
qwC?stion of the most "practicAl" approach,
matter and is not before the court.
supra,

is a leqislatiVt

As stated in~,

"Our inquiry is limited to th1> ouestion whether 'ar
.

.f

state of facts reasonably mav be conceived tn iust1 v
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statute.
Armed with a aeneral indication of support from the
annexing area, the municipal legislati?e body procee~s to
review the annexation in light of its resources an~ the
equities of the matter and 0etermine the advisability of the
boundary nroposal.

Durina this review, each citizen is

"given a voice" throuah the public hearina process.

Such a

process is efficient and fundamentally consistent with state
policy and constitutional qovernment.

No basis for an equal

protecton claim exists in the face of such a relationship.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Utah has very recently spoken in
clear and decisive support of Tltah's annexation statute as
beinq constitutional.

In ctoing so, it has stated that "[w]e

find no basis in the Constitution for

~akina

the general

annexation process subiect to conditions bevond those stated
in the statute."

See Freeman v. Centerville Citv, supra.

In that same case, this court statea that "ftlhe initiation
of the annexation process bv oetition is not the equivalent
of an election," but "is only the triaaering process for the
concernect municipality to consrnnmate the annexation
procedure by exercisinq its leaislative power if it deems it
appropriate to do so."

This Court concluded that:

"[t]he Le0islature was also clearly within
its riqht to provide a mechanis~ for
.
~nnexation which does not require an election
hv those affected."
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Contrarv to that rulin0 an~ the anolicahle case law fr~
virtually every other iurisdiction, the lower court has
taken an activist--and erroneous--oosition.

It equated tn,

annexation petition process, under Utah law, with the riqrr
to-vote-in-elections process, unrler the egual protectioo
clause of the federal and state constitutions.

The wishfu~

thinking of itinerant student writers in Law Review artk~
should not he the basis of. upsettinq lona-estahlishec'l ancl
soun<'f leqal princioles pertainino to annexation, so recent!
reaffirmed by this court.
As coaently pointed out bv the

Unite~

States Fourth

Circuit Court of Appeals in Berry v. Bourne, supra, with
respect to the proposed elevation of the annexation oroces!
by the Harvard Law Review to a f'l_ore lofty acanemic realri or
the bootstraps of the equal protection clause:
"Such an argument is supported by no
authority and appears to us to be an extreme
exercise in preciosity and without merit."
It is submi tten that the decision of tre lower court:
this case is equally as ill-anvisen by the Utah Law Review
and should be placed in prOPPr cons ti tut ion al perspectiVP t
a speedy reversal.
Resnectfully suhmitted,

P. CTJTT.F.R
Citv Attnrnev

ROGEP
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